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BACKGROUND: Systematic reviews for the US Preventive
Services Task Force have found less high-quality evidence
on psychological than physical harms of screening. To
understand the extent of evidence on psychological
harms, we developed an evidence map that quantifies
the distribution of evidence on psychological harms for
five adult screening services. We also note gaps in the
literature and make recommendations for future
research.
METHODS: We systematically searched PubMed,
PsycInfo, and CINAHL from 2002 to 2012 for studies of
any research design that assessed the burden or frequen-
cy of psychological harm associated with screening for:
prostate and lung cancers, osteoporosis, abdominal aortic
aneurysm (AAA) and carotid artery stenosis (CAS). We
also searched for studies that estimated rates of overdiag-
nosis (a marker for unnecessary labeling). We included
studies published in English and used dual independent
review to determine study inclusion and to abstract infor-
mation on design, types of measures, and outcomes
assessed.
RESULTS: Sixty-eight studies assessing psychological
harms met our criteria; 62 % concerned prostate cancer
and 16 % concerned lung cancer. Evidence was scant for
the other three screening services. Overall, only about
one-third of the studies used both longitudinal designs
and condition-specific measures (ranging from 0 % for
AAA and CAS to 78 % for lung cancer), which can provide
the best evidence on harms. An additional 20 studies that
met our criteria estimated rates of overdiagnosis in lung
or prostate cancer. No studies estimated overdiagnosis for
the non-cancer screening services.
DISCUSSION: Evidence on psychological harms varied
markedly across screening services in number and poten-
tial usefulness. We found important evidence gaps for all
five screening services. The evidence that we have on
psychological harms is inadequate in number of studies
and in research design and measures. Future research
should focusmore clearly on the evidence that weneed for
decision making about screening.
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INTRODUCTION
To develop rational recommendations about screening, guide-
line panels need evidence about potential benefits and
harms.1–3 However, reviews of screening often report that
high-quality evidence about patient harms is scarce relative
to evidence about benefits.4,5 Further, there appears to be less
emphasis on psychological harms that result from screening
compared to physical harms. This may be due to a lack of
high-quality evidence on psychological harms, or because
some might consider these harms to be trivial.
Psychological harms resulting from screening can affect
large numbers of patients and thus should not be overlooked.
These harms can be mild to severe and include, but are not
limited to, anxiety, distress and decrements in health-related
quality of life.6,7 One way to categorize these harms is along
the steps in the “screening cascade”3 where they occur. For
example, harmsmay occur before having a screening test (e.g.,
anticipation of a positive result); after the screening test but
before being told the results (e.g., anxiety about test results);
after a positive or abnormal screening test (e.g., worry about
and overestimation of the likelihood of a diagnosis); after a
positive workup (e.g., distress at being diagnosed with the
condition, referred to as “labeling”); and both before and
during treatment (e.g., deterioration in health-related quality
of life). Because screening leads to earlier diagnoses, an un-
derstanding of the effects of being labeled with a condition is
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of particular interest; further, in the case of overdiagnosis, this
labeling is unnecessary.
To arrive at a broader understanding of patient harms, we
need to know both the psychological “burden” that can result
from the screening process and the frequency with which
people experience these burdens. Burden refers to the magni-
tude of the psychological reaction experienced by the patient
or family, including its severity, duration, and effect on daily
functioning. Furthermore, as different individuals may expe-
rience different levels of psychological burden from the same
situation (e.g., anxiety caused by receipt of a false-positive
result), we also need to know the frequency with which people
experience psychological burdens that could be considered
severe, moderate, or mild.
When assessing screening harms, it is also important that
the methodology used is adequate for establishing psycholog-
ical burden. The strongest designs that can provide the most
useful information about psychological harms use condition-
specific measures that are responsive to the more subtle reac-
tions that can result from screening.8,9 They also use longitu-
dinal designs to assess these burdens over crucial time points
in the screening cascade. Cross-sectional studies or those that
use only insensitive, general measures (such as the SF-36) are
potentially less useful for studying screening harms.
To aid expert panels and clinicians engaging patients in
informed decision making, we systematically searched the
research literature to develop an evidence map of the psycho-
logical harms associated with five adult screening services, all
reviewed by the United States Preventive Services Task Force
(USPSTF) within the past 4 years. Our study aimwas to assess
the availability of current evidence on psychological harms,
reporting the number and characteristics of studies addressing
the burden or frequency of specific types of psychological
harms for each screening service. In characterizing the studies,
we gathered information about the study designs (qualitative,
longitudinal or cross-sectional), types of measures (general-
ized vs. condition-specific), and types of outcomes assessed
(anxiety, distress, etc.) To focus our study’s scope, we did not
assess additional quality indicators of the studies or report their
results.
METHODS
Quantifying Psychological Harms Studies
in USPSTF Reviews
As a preliminary step for our study, we quantified the number
of citations on psychological harms, compared to physical
harms, in the evidence reviews conducted for the USPSTF
for five selected adult screening services related to pros-
tate10,11 and lung cancers,12,13 abdominal aortic aneu-
rysm,14,15 osteoporosis,16,17 and carotid artery stenosis.18,19
To do this, one reviewer examined all full evidence reviews
for these screening services, as published on the Agency for
Health Care and Quality (AHRQ) website, and tabulated the
numbers of citations that included information on psycholog-
ical or physical harms (Table 1). A second reviewer confirmed
these numbers.
Review of Additional Studies on Psychological
Harms
Data Sources and Searches. To identify studies in addition to
those identified by the USPSTF reviews, we systematically
searched electronic databases (PubMed, PsycInfo, CINAHL),
with the guidance of an experienced health science librarian,
for research studies published from 1 January 2002 through 31
December 2012. We chose these dates to capture the most
current evidence relevant to screening harms, as interest in this
topic has accelerated during the past decade. We also searched
reference lists of included studies and the full-evidence version
of systematic reviews conducted for the USPSTF. Search
terms are provided in Appendix A (online).
Study Selection. We selected five screening services to
represent a balanced sample of conditions, including cancer
and non-cancer conditions, services with higher and lower
public visibility, and those with positive and negative USPSTF
recommendation grades (Appendix B, online). Our previously
published systematic reviews characterize the large literature
on psychological harms related to mammography screen-
ing6,7; thus, we did not include breast cancer screening in
our current review.The screening services we selected were:
& prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test to screen for prostate
cancer;
& low-dose computerized tomography to screen for lung
cancer;
& abdominal ultrasound to screen for abdominal aortic
aneurysm (AAA);
& bone mineral density (DEXA) scanning to screen for
osteoporosis; and
& Doppler ultrasound to screen for carotid artery stenosis
(CAS).
For each screening service, we searched for research studies
providing evidence about psychological harms that can occur
at the various steps of the screening cascade.We simplified the
steps of the screening cascade into three categories: (1) the
Table 1. Number of Citations in USPSTF Reviews on Screening and
Treatment Harms
Citations
Disease screened for Physical Harms Psychological
Harms
Prostate cancer 34 5
Lung cancer 22 5
Abdominal aortic aneurysm 17 8
Osteoporosis 29 2
Carotid artery stenosis 47 0
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screening test itself or workup of an abnormal test result; (2)
receipt of a false-positive result, defined as a positive or
indeterminate screening followed by a negative workup; or
(3) being labeled with a new diagnosis of a condition. We
deemed false-positives as not applicable to osteoporosis and
AAA screening (tests where the screening and diagnostic tests
are the same). Although the abstracts and full-text articles we
examined did not typically use the term “labeling”, we con-
sidered studies that examined the psychological burden of
people newly diagnosed, but not yet treated, to be evidence
about labeling. We did not search for evidence on psycholog-
ical effects of treatment, in order to focus the study’s scope.
We also searched for studies that estimated rates of overdi-
agnosis for each screening service. We did this to indirectly
assess the extent to which labeling occurs unnecessarily due to
overdiagnosis. We defined overdiagnosis as detecting condi-
tions that would never progress to important health problems,
even without treatment. Examples include prostate or lung
cancers that would not cause symptoms in the patients’ life-
time, small AAA that are not large enough for surgery, CAS in
people who would never suffer a stroke, or osteoporosis in
people who would never suffer a fracture.
At least two independent reviewers screened all titles and
abstracts for relevance and reviewed the full text of relevant
studies for potential inclusion. We included published empir-
ical research of any study design (quantitative and qualitative)
that reported either the burden or frequency of psychological
harm. Included populations were adults who were age-eligible
for screening. We did not make exclusions based on timing of
the outcome data or study sample size. We excluded studies
from non-OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development) countries or that were not published in
English, or that focused on higher risk populations. We also
excluded studies focusing solely on treatment effects, physical
effects such as sexual functioning or pain, or decisional con-
flict or uncertainty regarding treatment. For studies on rates of
overdiagnosis, we included modeling, ecological, pathology
and randomized controlled trial designs.
Data Abstraction.We abstracted general characteristics of the
studies including category of psychological harm (i.e.,
screening test/workup; false-positive result; or labeling), study
design, numbers of participants, type of measure (general vs.
condition-specific), whether the study reported burden or fre-
quency of psychological harm, and outcome variables. One
reviewer abstracted the data, and a second reviewer confirmed
it. We resolved disagreements through discussions with a third
reviewer.
RESULTS
Our preliminary review of the USPSTF full evidence reviews
found that they cited more studies about physical harms than
about psychological harms for all five screening services
(Table 1). Of the 169 citations, 88 % were about physical
harms, while only 12 % were on psychological harms.
Our subsequent systematic search for studies on psycholog-
ical harms yielded the most studies for prostate cancer screen-
ing (k=6,346) and the least for CAS screening (k=264)
(Fig. 1). Studies meeting our criteria and included in our
review (k=88) were 54 (61 %) for prostate cancer screening,
19 (22 %) for lung cancer screening, eight (9 %) for AAA
screening, six (7 %) for osteoporosis screening and one (1 %)
for CAS screening. Among the 88 studies, 68 were studies that
assessed psychological harms and 20 estimated rates of over-
diagnosis; we discuss these two categories of studies
separately.
Studies varied in sample size from a small qualitative as-
sessment on harms (n=7) to large randomized controlled trials
on prostate (n=4,198) and lung cancer screenings (n=4,104)
that included measures of psychological burden (Appendix C,
online). We also included four registry-based studies on pros-
tate cancer that assessed hospitalization, suicide or prescrip-
tion of antidepressants. We found a variety of designs for the
overdiagnosis studies. Most were modeling studies (k=10)
followed by pathology/imaging studies (k=7); we found two
Figure 1. PRISMA diagram for five screening services.
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follow-up studies from RCTs and one ecological study that
used SEER data.
Evidence by Screening Service and Harms
Category
We found considerable variation in the number of studies
across screening service (Fig. 2). Among the 68 studies on
psychological harms, 62 % (42/68) concerned prostate cancer
screening and 16 % (11/68) concerned lung cancer screening.
A combined 22 % (15/68) concerned screening for the other
three conditions. We also found variation in the number of
studies addressing different categories of psychological harms.
Twelve studies assessed psychological harms associated with
the screening test or workup for prostate cancer, but fewer for
lung cancer screening (k=4) and osteoporosis screening (k=
3); no studies examined screening or workup harms of screen-
ing for CAS or AAA. We found six studies that assessed
effects of false-positive test results for prostate cancer screen-
ing and five for lung cancer screening. There were none for
CAS screening. Other than the scant evidence on labeling, no
other studies examined the psychological harms for AAA or
CAS screening.
We found 26 studies assessing labeling effects for pros-
tate cancer screening and eight studies for AAA screening;
very few studies examined labeling for lung cancer (k=2),
osteoporosis screening (k=3) and CAS screening (k=1). We
found 20 studies that estimated rates of overdiagnosis (a
marker of unnecessary labelling) for prostate cancer screening
(k=12) and lung cancer screening (k=8); we did not find any
studies on overdiagnosis for the three non-cancer screening
tests.
Overall, studies assessing psychological harms more often
described the burden of harm (k=58; 85 %); fewer studies (k=
25; 37 %) reported the frequency with which patients experi-
enced different levels of these reactions. Sixteen studies
(24 %) reported information on both the burden and frequency
of psychological harm.
Evidence by Design, Measurement and
Outcome
Of the 68 studies assessing psychological harms of screening,
36 (53 %) used longitudinal study designs and 11 (16 %) used
cross-sectional designs (Fig. 3). Nineteen studies (28 %) used
qualitative study designs and two (3 %) used mixed methods.
Qualitative studies largely came from the prostate cancer
literature (k=13); few came from the osteoporosis (k=3), lung
cancer (k=3), and AAA (k=1) literatures.
Of the 49 non-qualitative studies on psychological harms,
16 (33 %) used both a longitudinal design and included
condition-specific measures to assess psychological burden,
providing the best evidence for conclusions. Studies meeting
these two quality criteria varied by screening service. For
prostate cancer screening, 30 % (nine of 30) met these criteria
and 78 % (seven of nine) met these criteria for lung cancer
screening. One of the three studies met these criteria for
osteoporosis screening. We found four studies with longitudi-
nal designs for AAA screening, none of which used condition-
specific measures. We found no studies using a longitudinal
design for CAS screening.
Across screening services, the most commonly studied
outcomes were psychological reactions such as worry and
Figure 2. Number of studies assessing categories of psychological harms (k=68) and rates of overdiagnosis (k=20).
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distress (k= 40), health-related quality of life (k= 38) and
anxiety (k=23). There were fewer assessments of depression
(k=14). For each of these outcomes, the number of studies
using longitudinal designs and condition-specific measures
varied by screening service (Appendix D, online).
DISCUSSION
We found considerable variation across the five screening
services in the available evidence on the psychological harms.
Our search revealed only a small total number of studies on
any category of psychological harm for any screening service,
with more studies about the psychological harms of prostate
and lung cancer screening than for non-cancer screening
(AAA, osteoporosis and CAS). Even among the available
studies on harms, few used both longitudinal designs and
condition-specific measures, study characteristics that are
most likely to provide the most useful information on psycho-
logical harms.
We found no studies meeting our criteria that estimated
rates of overdiagnosis for any of the three non-cancer condi-
tions; this evidence was available only for prostate and lung
cancer. The absence of information on overdiagnosis for the
non-cancer screenings may be due to difficulties in conceptu-
alizing overdiagnosis (such as in osteoporosis, where diagno-
sis and treatment are conceptualized as reducing the risk of
fractures), or because of a lower awareness of the possibility
for overdiagnosis with these conditions. Evidence on the
frequency of overdiagnosis is important in understanding the
extent to which negative effects due to labeling (or treatment)
occur unnecessarily.
It is interesting to speculate why such a disparity in evi-
dence across screening services exists. Prostate cancer screen-
ing clearly dominates the psychological harms literature, like-
ly because of its high incidence and visibility in the media.
Lung cancer screening had the second largest number of
studies, many conducted after a recently published random-
ized controlled trial of screening,20 which increased the test’s
visibility. We found very little evidence about the harms of
non-cancer screening; it may be that the potential for psycho-
logical harm from non-cancer screening is either not widely
recognized or discounted as having a small burden. Yet, Salter
and colleagues caution that simply labeling women “at risk”
for osteoporosis based on screening test results can have a
negative effect on their physical, mental and emotional states
of well-being.21 The lack of information about potential psy-
chological burden caused by these seemingly harmless tests
represents a major gap in the evidence.
In addition to the gap in the volume of evidence, we also
found a gap in the potential usefulness of the evidence pro-
vided by the studies that are available. About one-quarter of
the studies found in our search reported qualitative studies;
most of them on prostate cancer screening. This designmay be
quite appropriate for guiding future work in the development
of condition-specific measures or for gaining a deeper under-
standing of the burdens experienced by patients when under-
going screening. Qualitative studies, however, are limited by
their inability to provide information about the frequency with
which populations experience these burdens. Only one-third
of non-qualitative studies used both a longitudinal design and
a condition-specific measure of harm, an optimal design when
examining psychological burden.8 We found that most studies
used either non-longitudinal designs or generalized measures,
limiting potential interpretation.7 This finding suggests that
many studies may report null findings even when psycholog-
ical harms are truly present.
Finally, our work highlights a lack of attention to the psy-
chological harms of unnecessary labeling due to overdiagno-
sis. Although being labeled with a condition may theoretically
bring about positive health effects (e.g., beneficial lifestyle
changes), any benefit must be viewed in light of the potential
negative effects (e.g. anxiety, altered self-concept etc.). Thus,
labeling constitutes an important potential harm of screening.
To understand the effects of unnecessary labeling, we must
understand any psychological effects and also the extent to
which overdiagnosis occurs for a given condition. We found
variation in the availability of information on labeling (regard-
less of overdiagnosis) across screening services. We found
some studies that provide information about the burden of
labeling for prostate cancer and AAA screening, but few
studies for the other screening tests. Evidence on labeling from
prostate cancer screening largely came from the literature on
men’s psychological reactions while pursuing a watchful
waiting strategy or undergoing active surveillance. This liter-
ature contributes to the understanding of labeling, because it
disentangles the effects of diagnosis from treatment. Evidence
on labeling in the AAA screening literature comes mostly
from patients under surveillance for small abnormalities, but
we found that this literature was limited by design and mea-
surement. Considering the availability of evidence on overdi-
agnosis and labeling together, we can draw very few conclu-
sions about the extent to which labeling effects occur unnec-
essarily. This topic signals another major gap in the evidence.
Figure 3. Designs of studies assessing psychological harms (k=68).
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Our findings have implications for future research. Gaps in
the available evidence indicate the need for researchers to have
a systematic framework for considering the psychological
harms of screening. We have previously proposed a taxonomy
of harms that may be useful in this regard.3 Our taxonomy
may be especially useful for non-cancer screening, as there
may be less appreciation of the psychological harms associat-
ed with these screening services. Researchers should also
consider longitudinal research designs and sensitive,
condition-specific measurement instruments when assessing
psychological harms.7,8,22 Finally, studies should provide in-
formation on both psychological burden and the frequency
with which patients experience various levels of burden.
Our study also has implications for clinicians’ interpreta-
tions of guidelines and their communications with patients
about screening. Balanced decision making about screening
requires adequate evidence about both benefits and harms.
Our findings suggest that, for some screening services, evi-
dence about the potential for psychological harms is absent or
based on studies of weak methodological quality. Yet, the
absence of high-quality evidence on psychological harms does
not mean that these harms are not present. Clinicians and
patients should consider the uncertainty due to lack of useful
evidence when making screening decisions. Clinicians should
include psychological harms in communicating the balance of
potential benefits and harms to patients.
Psychological harms may be important either by carrying a
high burden or by occurring very frequently (or both). Some
psychological harms may not be severe enough to classify as
pathology, but the distress may affect large numbers of people
and thus should not be routinely dismissed as small. Other
harms may lead to severe psychological problems for a small
number of predisposed people.23 In neither case should clini-
cians draw the conclusion that harms are trivial and can be
discounted.
Our study has some limitations. First, while we assessed
some quality indicators including the designs of studies and
their use of condition-specific measures, we did not conduct
additional quality assessments (e.g., assess whether studies
used an appropriate control group). It is likely that some of
the studies we found were limited in ways beyond research
design and measures. This, however, would make our conclu-
sions about the lack of high quality evidence even stronger; the
body of high-quality evidence may be even smaller than our
findings suggest. Second, we acknowledge that lack of evi-
dence on psychological harms could be due to publication bias
when the harm is trivial. Third, the generalizability of our
findings beyond the five screening services that we examined
is uncertain. However, we carefully selected a balanced group
of services for examination. We encourage further reviews of
the evidence about screening harms for other services. Lastly,
our review only considered psychological harms; the extent to
which other domains of harms are understudied (i.e. financial
strain, opportunity costs and hassles) is not clear, but we
suspect that little research also exists for these domains.
In summary, our findings point to important gaps in the
evidence that we have on psychological harms, as contrasted
with the evidence we need, to make balanced decisions about
screening. We also encourage guideline panels and clinicians
not to interpret the lack of evidence as indicating that harms
are absent or trivial. We encourage future researchers to adopt
a broader conceptualization of screening harms to ask the
important questions, and to design high quality research to
answer them. Only then can the evidence we have on screen-
ing harms match the evidence we need.
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